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ON SOME BLOCK CIPHERS AND IMPRIMITIVE GROUPS
A. CARANTI, F. DALLA VOLTA, AND M. SALA
Abstract. The group generated by the round functions of a block ciphers is a widely
investigated problem. We identify a large class of block ciphers for which such group
is easily guaranteed to be primitive. Our class includes the AES and the SERPENT.
1. Introduction
Most block ciphers are iterated block ciphers, i.e. they are obtained by the composi-
tion of several “rounds” (or “round functions”). A round is a key-dependent permutation
of the message/cipher space. To achieve efficiency, all rounds share a similar structure.
For a given cipher, it is an interesting problem to determine the permutation group
generated by its round functions (with the key varying in the key space), since this group
might reveal weaknesses of the cipher. However, these results usually require an ad-hoc
proof (with a notable recent exception [14]).
In this paper we consider a class of block ciphers, large enough to contain some
well-known ciphers (like the AES and the SERPENT), which is such that the primi-
tivity of the related group can be easily established by only checking some properties
of its S-Boxes. Our results may be useful to cipher designers wanting to avert group
imprimitivity, since in our context they would do it easily.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Group theory and finite field theory. Let G be a finite group acting tran-
sitively on a set V and H ≤ G a subgroup. We write the action of an element
g ∈ G on an element α ∈ V as αg. Also, αG = {αg : g ∈ G } is the orbit of α
and Gα = { g ∈ G : αg = α } is its stabilizer. A partition B of V is G-invariant if
for any B ∈ B and g ∈ G, one has Bg ∈ B. Partition B is trivial if B = {V } or
B = { {α } : α ∈ V }. If B is non-trivial then it is a block system for the action of G
on V (and any B ∈ B is a block). If such a block system exists, then we say that G
is imprimitive in its action on V (equivalently, G acts imprimitively on V ). If G is
not imprimitive (and it is transitive), then we say that it is primitive. Since G acts
transitively on V , we have then B = {Bg : g ∈ G }.
Lemma 2.1 ([1], Theorem 1.7). Let G be a finite group, acting transitively on a set V .
Let α ∈ V . Then the blocks B containing α are in one-to-one correspondence with the
subgroups H such that with Gα < H < G. The correspondence is given by B = αH.
In particular, G is primitive if and only if Gα is a maximal subgroup of G.
Date: June 2008 — Version 6.06.
Key words and phrases. AES, key-alternating block ciphers, primitive groups.
Caranti and Dalla Volta are members of INdAM-GNSAGA, Italy. Caranti has been partially sup-
ported by MIUR-Italy via PRIN 2001012275 “Graded Lie algebras and pro-p-groups of finite width,
loop algebras, and derivations”. Dalla Volta has been partially supported by MIUR-Italy via PRIN
“Group theory and applications”. Sala has been partially supported by STMicroelectronics contract
“Complexity issues in algebraic Coding Theory and Cryptography”.
1
2 A. CARANTI, F. DALLA VOLTA, AND M. SALA
We denote by Sym(V ) and Alt(V ), respectively, the symmetric and alternating group
on V . When V is a vector space over a finite field Fq with q elements, we also denote by
T(V ) the translation group T(V ) = {σv : v ∈ V }, where σv : V → V, w 7→ w + v .
It is well-known that T(V ) is a transitive subgroup of Sym(V ), which is imprimitive
except for the trivial case V = Fp, with p a prime. Any block system B of T(V ) is the
set of translates of a proper vector subspace W of V , that is, B = {W + v | v ∈ V }.
We denote by AGL(V ) the group of all affine permutations of V , which is a primitive
maximal subgroup of Sym(V ), and by GL(V ) the group of all linear permutations of V ,
which is a normal subgroup of AGL(V ).
We will need the following result from finite field theory.
Theorem 2.2 ([8],[4]). Let F be a field of characteristic two. Suppose U 6= 0 is an
additive subgroup of F which contains the inverses of each of its nonzero elements.
Then U is a subfield of F.
2.2. Vectorial Boolean functions. Let m ≥ 1 be a natural number. Let A = (F2)
m
and A∗ = A \ {0}. Any function F : A→ A is a vectorial Boolean function (vBf).
For any function F : A→ A and any elements a, b ∈ A, a 6= 0, we denote
δF (a, b) = |{x ∈ A : F (x+ a) + F (x) = b}| .
Let δ ∈N. Function F is called a differentially δ-uniform function ([10]) if
∀a ∈ A∗,∀b ∈ A, δF (a, b) ≤ δ .
The smallest such δ is called the differential uniformity of F . Note that δ ≥ 2 for any
vBf. Differentially 2-uniform mappings are called almost perfect nonlinear, or APN for
short. If we denote by Fˆa the vBf which maps x 7→ F (x+a)+F (x), then F is differential
δ-uniform if and only if |(Fˆa)
−1(b)| ≤ δ (for any a and b). From now on, we shorten
“differential uniformity” to “uniformity”.
Vectorial Boolean functions used as S-boxes in block ciphers must have low uniformity
to prevent differential cryptanalysis (see [9, 10]). In this sense, APN functions are
optimal. However, numerous experiments suggest the following conjecture
Conjecture 2.3 (Dobbertin). If m is even, no APN function is a permutation.
If this conjecture is true, then APN functions cannot be used as S-Boxes, since im-
plementation issues require an even m.
Any vBf can also be regarded as a polynomial in F2m [x] (with degree at most 2
m−1).
When m is even, the patched inverse function x2
m
−2 is a 4-uniform permutation ([10])
and was chosen as the basic S-box, with m = 8, in the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) ([2]).
2.3. Previous results on the group generated by the round functions. Let C
be any block cipher such that the plain-text space M coincides with the cipher space.
Let K be the key space. Any key k ∈ K induces a permutation τk on M. Since M
is usually V = (F2)
n for some n ∈ N, we can consider τk ∈ Sym(V ). We denote by
Γ = Γ(C) the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by all the τk’s. In literature the following
properties of Γ are considered undesirable, since they could lead to weaknesses of C:
small cardinality, imprimitivity and intransitivity. For a detailed discussion of their
consequences, see [14]. We would add that Γ should not be a subgroup of AGL(V ),
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otherwise it is obvious how to break the cipher. If Γ turns out to be Alt(V ) or Sym(V ),
these properties are automatically avoided. Note also that primitivity alone guarantees
a non-negligible group size, but it could still be that Γ would be weak (as for example
if Γ ≤ AGL(V )).
Unfortunately, the knowledge of Γ(C) is out of reach for the most important ciphers
(such as the AES, the SERPENT, the DES, the IDEA). However, researchers have been
able to compute another related group. Suppose that C is the composition of l rounds.
Remark 2.4. Note that the division into rounds is not mathematically well-defined, but
it is provided in the document describing the cipher, so this division is debatable and a
cryptanalyst is allowed to modify it, if it is convenient.
Then any key k would induce l permutations, τk,1, . . . , τk,l, whose composition is τk.
For any round h, we can consider Γh(C) as the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by the
τk,h’s (with k varying in V ). We can thus define the group Γ∞ = Γ∞(C) as the subgroup
of Sym(V ) generated by all the Γh’s. We note the following elementary fact.
Fact 1. Γ ≤ Γ∞ .
Group Γ∞ is traditionally called the group generated by the round functions. Note that
independent sub-keys are implicitly assumed. We collect in the following proposition
some previous results on Γ∞.
Proposition 2.5.
• Γ∞(AES) = Alt(V ) [16],
• Γ∞(SERPENT) = Alt(V ) [17],
• Γ∞(DES) = Alt(V ) [18].
The proof of any of the results in Proposition 2.5 requires an ad-hoc proof. Recently,
a generalization of some of these results have been proposed [14].
3. A class of block ciphers
Several definitions have been proposed for iterated block ciphers (see e.g. key-alternating
block cipher in [2], or Rjindael-like ciphers in [14]). We would like to define a class, large
enough to include most common ciphers, yet restricted enough to have simple criteria
guaranteeing the primitivity of Γ∞.
Let C be a block cipher with V = (F2)
n and n = ms, s ≥ 2. Space V is a direct sum
V = V1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Vs,
where each Vi has the same dimension m (over F2). For any v ∈ V , we will write
v = v1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vs, where vi ∈ Vi. Also, we consider the projections pii : V → Vi mapping
v 7→ vi. Any γ ∈ Sym(V ) that acts as
vγ = v1γ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vsγs,
for some γi ∈ Sym(Vi), is a bricklayer transformation and any γi is a brick. When
used in symmetric cryptography, maps γi’s are traditionally called S-boxes and map γ
is called a “parallel S-box”.
A linear (or affine) map λ : V → V is traditionally called a “mixing layer”, when used
in composition with parallel maps.
In the following definitions we are not following established notation.
We call any linear map λ ∈ GL(V ) a proper mixing layer if no sum of some of the
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Vi (except { 0 } and V ) is invariant under λ. A similar definition can be given when
λ ∈ AGL(V ).
We define our class.
Definition 3.1. We say that C is translation based (tb) if it is the composition of some
rounds, such that any is of the form τk,h = γhλhσk, with k ∈ V (γh and λh do not depend
on k, but they might depend on the round), where γh is a bricklayer transformation and
λh is a linear map (but λh is a proper mixing layer for at least one round).
A round when the mixing layer is proper is called a proper round.
Remark 3.2. A round consisting of only a translation is still acceptable, by taking γh =
λh = 1V (the identity map on V ), although obviously it is not proper.
The previous definition is similar to key-alternating block cipher (see Section 2.4.2
of [2]), although the latter is too general for our goals.
From now on, we assume C is a tb cipher and that 0γ = 0 (this can always be
assumed). From the knowledge of block systems of T (V ), we immediately obtain the
following.
Fact 2. Let G = Γh(C) for any round h. Then T = T (V ) ⊂ G. Therefore, if G acts
imprimitively on M = V , the blocks of imprimitivity are the translates of a linear
subspace.
Proof. We show T ⊂ G. For any k ∈ V , we have γhλhσk ∈ G. By considering the zero
key, we have also γhλhσ0 = γhλh ∈ G. Therefore, (γhλh)
−1γhλhσk = σk ∈ G. 
Corollary 3.3. Let G = Γh(C) for any round h. Then G acts imprimitively if and only
if there is a subspace U < V (U 6= {0}, V ) such that for any v ∈ V and u ∈ U , we have
(3.1) (v + u)γhλh + vγhλh ∈ U.
Proof. G is imprimitive if and only if there is a block system of type {v + U}, for some
subspace U , U 6= {0}, V .
It is enough to consider a zero round key, so that
(v + U)γhλhσ0 = vγhλhσ0 + U =⇒ (v + U)γhλh = vγhλh + U .

4. Main results
We define for a vBf f two new notions of non-linearity. The first is weaker than
δ-uniformity.
Definition 4.1. For any m ≥ 2 and δ ≥ 2, let A = (F2)
m and f ∈ Sym(A). We say
that f is weakly δ-uniform if for any u ∈ A, u 6= 0, the size of image of fˆu is at least
|Im(fˆu)| ≥
2m
δ + 2
+ 1 .
It is trivial to prove that a δ-uniform map is indeed weakly δ-uniform.
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Proof. Let B = Im(fˆu). If f is δ-uniform, then |(fˆu)
−1(b)| ≤ δ, for any b ∈ B.
From A = ⊔b∈B(fˆu)
−1(b), we have
A = ⊔b∈B(fˆu)
−1(b) =⇒ 2m = |A| =
∑
b∈B
|(fˆu)
−1(b)| ≤ δ|B|
which means
|B| ≥
2m
δ
>
2m
δ + 2
.

Remark 4.2. If a function f is weakly δ-uniform, with 2r ≥ δ and the image Im(fˆu)
is contained in a subspace W , then the dimension of W is at least m − r. This is the
property of f which will be needed in the proof of Theorem 4.4. Interestingly, if f is
δ-uniform (as in Subsection 2.2), then the dimension of W which can be guaranteed is
exactly the same (and not any bigger).
Our second notion focuses on the image of vector spaces.
Definition 4.3. Let A = (F2)
m. We say that f is l-anti-invariant if for any subspace
U ≤ A such that f(U) = U we have dim(U) < m− l or U = A.
We say that f is strongly l-anti-invariant, if for any two subspaces U,W ≤ A, such
that f(U) =W , we have dim(U) = dim(W ) < m− l or U =W = A.
In other words, l-anti-invariant means that the largest subspace invariant under f has
codimension greater than l (except for A itself), while strongly l anti-invariant means
that the largest subspace sent by f into another subspace has codimension greater than
l (except for A itself).
We are ready for our main result (recall that 0γ = 0).
Theorem 4.4. Let C be a tb cipher, with λh a proper mixing layer, and G = Γh(C).
Let 1 ≤ r < m/2. If any brick of γh is weakly 2
r-uniform and strongly r-anti-invariant,
then G is primitive and hence Γ∞(C) is primitive.
Proof. We drop the h-underscript in this proof and we suppose, by way of contradiction,
that G is imprimitive.
Let U be any proper subspace of V s.t. {v+U}v∈V form a block system for G. Since
U is a block and γλ ∈ G, we have Uγλ = U + v for some v ∈ V . But 0γλ = 0 ∈ U + v,
so v = 0 and
(4.1) Uγλ = U .
Let I be the set of all i s.t. pii(U) 6= 0. Clearly, I 6= ∅. Then:
• either U ∩ Vi = Vi for all i ∈ I,
• or there is ι ∈ I s.t. U ∩ Vι 6= Vι.
In the first case, U = ⊕IVi, which means Uγ = U . But (4.1) implies Uλ = U , which is
impossible since λ is a proper mixing layer.
In the second case, we denote W = Uγ (equal to Uλ−1 by (4.1)) and we note that
(4.2) (U ∩ Vι)γ
′ =W ∩ Vι ,
where γ′ = γι is the brick of γ in Vι. By Corollary 3.3, we have that B = Im(γˆ
′
u) ⊂W∩Vι
for any u ∈ U ∩ Vι. But γ
′ is weakly 2r-uniform, so (Remark 4.2) dim(W ∩ Vι) =
dim(U ∩ Vι) ≥ m− r. By (4.2), this is impossible, since γ
′ is strongly r-anti-invariant.

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To apply our theorem to the AES, we first need a simple lemma.
Lemma 4.5. Let f be a vBf. If f2 = 1 and f is 2r-anti-invariant with 1 ≤ r < m/2,
then f is strongly r-anti-invariant.
Proof. Let U,W be subspaces of codimension l such that Uf = W . Let us consider
Z = U ∩ Uf . By standard linear algebra, dim(Z) ≥ n − 2l. Since Zf = Z and f is
2r-anti-invariant, l must be l > r, and so U and W have codimension strictly bigger
than r. 
The first interesting consequence of our theorem is the following.
Corollary 4.6. Any typical round h of the AES satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 4.4.
As a consequence, both Γh(AES) and Γ∞(AES) are primitive.
Proof. We first show that the mixing layer λ = λh of a typical round of the AES is proper.
Suppose U 6= { 0 } is a subspace of V which is invariant under λ. Suppose, without loss
of generality, that U ⊇ V1. Because of MixColumns [2, 3.4.3], U contains the whole first
column of the state. Now the action of ShiftRows [2, 3.4.2] and MixColumns on the
first column shows that U contains four whole columns, and considering (if the state
has more than four columns) once more the action of ShiftRows and MixColumns, one
sees immediately that U = V .
The S-box γ′ is well-known to satisfy (for any u 6= 0) Im(γˆ′u) = 2
7 − 1 ≥ 26 + 1 and
so it is weakly 2-uniform.
To apply the theorem we need only to show that γ′ is strongly 1-anti-invariant. Since
(γ′)2 = 1, we want to apply Lemma 4.5 with r = 1. Indeed, γ′ is well-known to be
3-anti-invariant, since the only nonzero subspaces of GF(28) which are invariant under
inversion are the subfields (Theorem 2.2), and so the largest proper one is GF(24), of
codimension 4 > 3.

The second interesting consequence is the following.
Corollary 4.7. Any typical round h of the SERPENT satisfies the hypotheses of Theo-
rem 4.4. As a consequence, both Γh(SERPENT ) and Γ∞(SERPENT ) are primitive.
Proof. The conditions of Theorem 4.4 are satisfied with r = 1, as can be seen by a direct
computer check on all Serpent S-boxes and on its mixing layer ([13]). 
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